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In this paper I develop an empirical framework for the analysis of large-scale policies, and apply it to 
study the effects of school finance reform on the Detroit metropolitan area. Exploiting the school 
finance reform in Michigan 1994, I estimate a general equilibrium model of multiple jurisdictions 
with 1990 data from Detroit, predict the 2000 equilibrium, and compare this prediction with 2000 
data to validate the model. I conduct counterfactual simulations using the estimates. According to 
my analysis, revenue-based reforms that ensure spending equity or adequacy have little impact on 
household demographics or school quality in Detroit. (JEL C52, I22, H73) 
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Although typically aiming at specific effects, large-scale policies can often trigger other, 
general equilibrium effects as well. Thus, a comprehensive evaluation of these policies 
requires a general equilibrium framework. Furthermore, it is desirable that the framework 
serve not only for the analysis of actual but also of counterfactual policies, particularly in 
light of the potentially high cost and far-reaching consequences of large-scale policies. An 
important issue, however, is how to develop a reliable framework. Whereas the estimation 
of a model provides evidence on its fit to the data, perhaps more critical evidence comes 
from the model’s ability to fit out-of-sample data.  
In this paper I develop an empirical framework for the analysis of large-scale 
policies that relies on a general equilibrium model, allows for counterfactual analysis and 
conducts model validation, and apply it to study the effects of school finance reform on 
the Detroit metropolitan area. Concerned about the equity and adequacy of their public 
school funding systems, most states have overhauled them over the last thirty years. Thus, 
in 1994 the state of Michigan implemented a largely unexpected reform, known as 
Proposal A,
1 which shifted public school funding away from local school districts onto the 
state. School districts no longer determine their property tax rates and hence their 
revenues; instead, they receive from the state a per-student allowance (“foundation 
allowance”). This revenue scheme increased revenue for low-revenue districts, and capped 
revenues for high-revenue districts. Proposal A also implemented a tax reform by 
reducing property tax rates on owner-occupied housing, and raising the state sales tax. 
                                                 
1 See Adonizio et al (1995) and Cullen and Loeb (2004) for further details on the reform.   3
In metropolitan areas where households choose locations and schools jointly, a 
reform such as Proposal A may alter not only school revenues and property taxes, but also 
households’ choices, housing prices, and public schools’ qualities. For instance, districts 
that benefit from lower property taxes and higher revenues may experience an increase in 
property values and an improvement in local public school quality. They may also attract 
residents from other districts, which would further alter housing prices.  
I capture these effects through an equilibrium model of multiple jurisdictions and 
household residential and school choice, and estimate the structural parameters using 1990 
data for the Detroit metropolitan area. I use the parameter estimates to simulate the 2000 
equilibrium accounting for a number of changes in the metropolitan area over the decade – 
including the school finance reform - and then compare the predictions with the 2000 data. 
The model provides a reasonable fit for the in-sample data used for estimation and the out-
of-sample data used for validation, which lends credibility to the policy analysis.  
The existing literature on school funding reform encompasses two main types of 
studies. The first one uses calibrated models to investigate the equilibrium effects of 
school finance reform.
2 I build on this body of research by estimating an equilibrium 
model. Since the model lacks a closed-form solution, I apply the one-step, full solution 
estimator developed in Ferreyra (2007), and enhance it as follows. First, my 
computational representation of Detroit includes the actual 83 school districts and is thus 
richer than in previous studies. Second, I model revenues by using the actual state aid 
formulas rather than the simplifications used in previous estimation,
3 which is critical in 
light of my interest in school finance reform. Third, I am the first to use school 
                                                 
2 See, for instance, Nechyba (2004) and Fernandez and Fernandez and Rogerson (2003). 
3 Among other attempts to estimate locational equilibrium models, Calabrese et al (2006) and Ferreyra 
(2007) use simplifications of actual rules, whereas Bayer et al (2005) do not model revenue determination.    4
achievement data to identify the importance of peer quality (proxied by parental income) 
relative to school spending, in contrast with recent studies estimating Tiebout models with 
peer effects.
4 Although the lack of individual-level data prevents the identification of the 
mechanisms that give rise to actual peer effects, my estimates indicate that my measure of 
peer quality is more important than spending in the production of school quality, a finding 
with relevant implications for policy analysis. In order to use rich structure I overcome a 
number of empirical and computational challenges. Thus, in this paper I employ elements 
from the methodological frontier, enhance them, and apply them to a highly relevant and 
complex policy issue. 
Although scholars have recently used their parameter estimates from equilibrium 
models for policy simulations (Ferreyra 2007), no direct evidence exists on the 
simulations’ plausibility because the simulated policies have never been implemented in 
large scale. This paper, in contrast, is the first to validate a general equilibrium model of 
multiple jurisdictions through the simulation of an actual large-scale policy – Proposal A. 
Researchers have exploited opportunities for model validation that arise due to regime 
changes, treatment assignment or policy variation.
5 Although useful, this type of exercise 
is rather uncommon, perhaps because regime shifts are quite rare (Keane and Wolpin 
2006). While my framework for large-scale policy analysis is similar to Sieg et al (2004) 
in the use and estimation of a Tiebout model, it differs in that I allow the equilibrium level 
of the public good to adjust endogenously in the simulations in contrast to their holding it 
fixed. Thus, my approach is particularly adept to study large-scale policies. 
                                                 
4 See Calabrese et al (2006) and Ferreyra (2007). 
5 See, for instance, Keane and Moffitt (1998), Keane and Wolpin (2006), Lise et al (2003), Lumsdaine et al 
(1994), McFadden et al (1997), and Todd and Wolpin (2006).   5
The second group of studies on school finance reform includes empirical 
investigations. Most of them are partial equilibrium analyses that have focused on one 
type of effect,
6 although some have studied general equilibrium effects yet from a 
reduced-form perspective.
7 In particular, Epple and Ferreyra (2008) investigate the 
equilibrium effects of Proposal A in the Detroit metropolitan area. While I analyze the 
effects of Proposal A as well (with results broadly consistent with those of Epple and 
Ferreyra), I also examine alternative school funding reforms in Michigan. Thus, I am able 
to quantify each policy’s fiscal cost, effects on revenue and school quality, impact on 
property value and household residential choices, and distributional effects, all of which 
illuminate the potential political support for each reform. Confidence in these 
counterfactuals is enhanced by the fact that I estimate and validate the structural model, in 
contrast to the in-sample, reduced-form investigation from Epple and Ferreyra (2008). 
Furthermore, the recent wave of school finance reform litigation has focused on 
adequacy rather than equity in order to secure for each district the revenue needed for an 
adequate education (Reich 2006). Hence, an important contribution in this paper is the 
equilibrium analysis of an adequate funding regime, an exercise not conducted before in 
the literature. Considering equilibrium effects proves to be crucial in determining adequate 
revenue. The importance of this paper’s counterfactuals cannot be stressed enough, as the 
sheer dollar amount involved in school funding litigation -particularly over adequacy- 
points to the need for learning as much as possible about the effects of alternative regimes 
before incurring the very high costs of implementing any one of them. Moreover, the 
                                                 
6 See, for instance, Card and Payne (2002), Dee (2000), Downes (1992), Hoxby (2001), Murray et al (1998). 
For Michigan, see Cullen and Loeb (2004), Guilfoyle (1998), Loeb (2001), Papke (2005), Roy (2003, 2004). 
7 See Keely (2005) for Kentucky, Epple and Ferreyra (2008) and Roy (2004) for Michigan.   6
framework and insights from this paper can be applied to the analysis of school finance 
reform in other states, as 18 states are currently undergoing litigation.
8  
My analysis indicates that while Proposal A equalizes revenues to some extent, it 
is less effective at closing the school quality gap because the reform affects the input with 
the lesser role, on the margin, in the production of school quality. Thus, the reform only 
induces small demographic changes, which means that peer quality –and hence school 
quality- does not change much across districts. The property tax reduction is fully 
capitalized in housing values, and low-income households are Proposal A’s clear gainers.  
In addition to Proposal A, I analyze alternative regimes for revenue equity, some 
of which resemble those recently adopted by other states. In my simulations, even the 
most effective option -a uniform and high foundation- is quite limited in terms of closing 
the achievement gap despite its very high fiscal cost. The question then becomes: exactly 
what is the necessary funding level to secure the desired achievement in each district? 
Thus, I conduct an adequacy simulation whose main lesson is that when revenue is the 
only policy lever, even modest increases in achievement are fiscally very costly, and 
ambitious goals such as the 100 percent proficiency rate targeted by No Child Left Behind 
are prohibitively costly. These findings point to the need for reforms which do not rely –at 
least not solely- on revenues. While other studies have reached a similar conclusion,
9 this 
is the only paper to attain it by using an estimated and validated model, examining a 
variety of policy reforms, and quantifying each one’s equilibrium effects. My study, then, 
is particularly solid from a theoretical and empirical perspective. 
                                                 
8 The court rulings from November 2006 in Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York exemplify the 
dollar amounts of this type of litigation. New York’s court of appeals ruled that the state must spend an 
additional $1.93 billion for New York City public schools, short of the almost $5 billion requested by the 
plaintiffs. For information about current and past school finance litigation, see http://schoolfunding.info.  
9 See the discussion and references in section 7.   7
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights some 
changes in the Detroit metropolitan area between 1990 and 2000. Section 3 presents the 
theoretical model, and Section 4 describes the model’s computational version. Section 5 
presents the estimation strategy and results, Section 6 the out-of-sample prediction 
exercise, Section 7 presents the policy analysis, and Section 8 concludes. 
2. Detroit in 1990 and 2000 
A building block of my framework is the equilibrium computation as a function of the 
model’s exogenous variables. The endogenous variables of interest are district average 
household income, rental value, spending per student, and school quality. The exogenous 
variables are the state school finance regime, the metropolitan area income distribution, 
the district-level stock of non-residential property, and the neighborhood-level quantity 
and quality of housing. In the estimation (validation) I seek to match the 1990 (2000) 
values of the endogenous variables given the 1990 (2000) values of the exogenous 
variables. Hence, in this section I characterize Detroit in 1990 in terms of the endogenous 
variables, and describe the changes in the exogenous variables over the decade. I focus on 
the comparison between 1990 and 2000 because demographic and property value data, 
which come from the Census, are only available every ten years.  
Detroit is the largest metropolitan area in the state of Michigan, including eighty-
three school districts and a 1990 population of about 3.93 million. In 1990, about a quarter 
of the population lived in the city of Detroit, which is coterminous with the largest district 
in the metropolitan area (Detroit Public Schools). Data on income and rental value pertain 
to households with children in K-12 schools and come from the 1990 and 2000 School 
District Data Books. Revenues come from the 1989 and 1999 Bulletin 1014 from   8
Michigan’s Department of Treasury. Pass rates for the fourth grade math test, used to 
measure school quality, come from Michigan’s Department of Education.
10 Dollar figures 
are expressed in 2000 dollars. As Figures 1a and 1b show, in 1990 there was considerable 
variation in income and housing value across districts, with Detroit Public Schools 
ranking almost at the bottom. Similarly, local and state revenues differed widely across 
districts (Figure 1c) as did school achievement (Figure 1d). District average income, rental 
value, per-pupil revenue, and pass rates were highly and positively correlated.  
Proposal A was an important development for the metropolitan area over the 
decade, and Section 4 describes it in detail. Figure 2 displays revenues the year before the 
reform (“base revenue”) and the foundation allowances guaranteed by the state in 1999. 
The figure shows that the reform maintained the weak ordering of districts by revenue, 
and that revenue changes were relatively small in the metropolitan area,
11 although low- 
and high-revenue districts were clearly the gainers and losers in this reform, respectively. 
Nonetheless, when measured against revenues in 1989 instead of 1993, the percent gains 
in revenue over the decade were quite pronounced for several districts (Figure 4a). In 
addition, in 1991 Michigan implemented the Michigan Educational Assessment Program 
(MEAP), whose average pass rate rose from 34 percent in 1991 to 70 percent in 2000.
12  
                                                 
10 I calculate rental values by annuitizing average owner-occupied house values using the user cost rate. I 
omit rents in this calculation because the property tax reform applied only to owner-occupied housing units. 
The series of comparable achievement data begins in 1991. I compute the pass rate as the percent of students 
who obtain a grade of “satisfactory” in the state’s math test. Throughout, demographic data refer to Census 
years, and school-related data refer to the Fall of the corresponding school year. Revenue, spending and aid 
are per-student measures. The terms “revenue” and “spending” are interchangeably used.  
11 Revenue changes were more pronounced for rural districts, located outside the Detroit metropolitan area. 
12 The size of these gains must be interpreted with caution, as achievement gains are often quite large when a 
new test is introduced (Koretz 2002). The expansion of public school choice and the public school 
accountability implemented in Michigan over the 90s might explain some of the achievement growth, 
although these programs seem to have gained strength only after 2000 (Cullen and Loeb 2004 and Courant 
et al 2003) and some still remain quite limited, as documented below. Furthermore, Roy (2003) provides 
evidence that Michigan’s academic gains are much smaller when measured by federal rather than state tests.   9
Moreover, the metropolitan area income distribution also changed over the decade. 
While all segments of the income distribution experienced real gains, these were greater 
for the high and particularly low ends. For instance, at the deciles of the household income 






percentiles- real income grew by an approximate 24, 9, 8, 12 and 12 percent respectively.   
Figure 3 depicts 1990 neighborhood average housing quality.
13 This varied 
considerably across neighborhoods, with central city neighborhoods being among the 
lowest. Housing stock in the metropolitan area grew by 6.7 percent, and most of the 
growth took place in outer suburbs. Of interest in this paper is the change in neighborhood 
relative size, computed as the neighborhood share of the metropolitan area’s housing 
stock (Figure 4b). The central city, in particular, went from 27 to 23 percent of the total 
stock. Housing qualities also changed (Figure 4c); they improved the most in the outer 
suburbs although some neighborhoods in the central city improved as well.  
To summarize, over the nineties the Detroit metropolitan area experienced changes 
in aspects regarded as exogenous by the model. My goal is to study whether the model can 
predict the 1990 and 2000 “snapshots” of Detroit as a function of these aspects.  
3. The Model 
The model is based on Ferreyra (2007) and Nechyba (1999). In the model, a metropolitan 
area is populated by a continuum of households, each one endowed with a house. The set 
of houses in the metropolitan area is partitioned into school districts, and the size of the 
housing stock equals the measure of endowed houses. Every district d is partitioned into 
neighborhoods; there are H neighborhoods in total in the metropolitan area. Although 
                                                 
13 See section 4 for the definition of neighborhood and the calculation of housing quality parameters.   10
houses may differ in quality across neighborhoods, they have the same quality and rental 
price within a given neighborhood. The housing stock cannot be varied in quantity or 
quality. Each household has one child, who must attend a school. Schools are public, and 
there is one public school in each district. Since a child may only attend the public school 
where the household resides, choosing locations is equivalent to choosing schools. 
Households are heterogeneous in endowment (house plus income, with I income 
levels in the metropolitan area) and in idiosyncratic preferences for locations. The 
following Cobb-Douglas utility function describes household preferences:  
dh k e c s c s U = =
− − κ κ ε κ
ε α β β α     , ) , , , (
1       ( 1 )    
where  () 1 , 0 , ∈ β α , kdh is an exogenous parameter representing the inherent quality of 
neighborhood h in district d (i.e., housing size and age, geographic amenities, etc.), c is 
household consumption, s is quality of the child’s school, andε is the household’s 
idiosyncratic preference for the location. For a given household,ε varies across locations. 
Furthermore,ε is distributed according to a continuous distribution  ) (ε G , and is 
independently and identically distributed across locations for a given household and 
across households. 
Household i maximizes utility (1) subject to the following budget constraint: 
(1 ) (1 ) dd h yn n ct p t y p ++ =− +         ( 2 )  
where yn is the household’s income, ty is the state income tax rate, pn is the rental price of 
the household’s endowment house, and the right-hand side is the household’s total 
income. Thus, the household chooses to live in location  ) , ( h d  with housing price pdh and 
property tax rate td, and uses the remaining income for consumption c.  
Schools produce school quality s according to the following production function:   11
1 s qx
ρ ρ − =            ( 3 )  
where  [] 1 , 0 ∈ ρ , q stands for the school’s average peer quality and x is spending per 
student at the school. In district d, the school’s average peer quality is  dd qy = , where  d y  
is the average household income in the district. Thus, peer quality captures parental inputs 
outside spending that are positively associated with household income, such as parental 
engagement in the student’s and the school’s activities (McMillan 2000), and parenting 
skills and home inputs in the production of achievement (Rebell and Wolff 2008, and 
references therein). District d’s spending per student is  d x , funded by a combination of 
local property and state income taxes as shown below: 
  () d d d d d d AID n Q P t x + + =        ( 4 )  
where nd is the measure of households in district d,  d AID  is the state aid per student for 
district d,  and Pd and Qd are the values of residential and non-residential property in the 
district, respectively.
14 The public school finance regime described in this section applies 
before the reform; in Section 4 I note the modifications that apply afterwards. 
Households choose locations  ) , ( h d  and hence schools to maximize their utility 
subject to their budget constraint, while taking tax rates td, district public school qualities 
sd, prices pdh,, and community compositions as given. Migrating among locations is 
costless, and a household may choose to live in house other than its endowed house. In 
addition, households vote on local property tax rates, taking as given their location, 
property values, the state aid formula explained below, and the choices of others. 
Households’ preferences over property tax rates are single peaked, and property tax rates 
                                                 
14 For simplicity, I model non-residential property as inelastically supplied and owned by an absentee 
landlord. Hence, property taxes on non-residential property are fully capitalized, and the gross-of-tax rental 
price of non-residential property remains constant.   12
in each district are determined by majority voting.
15  
The state cooperates with district d by providing the per-student aid  d AID , funded 
by a state income tax whose rate  y t  balances the state budget constraint. Before Proposal 
A, the state applies a District Power Equalization (DPE) regime which guarantees a dollar 
yield per mill
16 levied by guaranteeing a minimum tax base (GTB) G, which is 
exogenously set. Thus, per-student aid for district d is given by the following formula: 
( ) ( ) ( ) max 0, / dd d d d AID t G P Q n =− +     (5) 
which voters internalize when voting for local property taxes.
17  
An equilibrium in this model specifies a partition of the population into districts 
and neighborhoods, local property tax rates td, a state income tax ty, and house prices pdh, 
such that: (a) every house is occupied; (b) property tax rates td are consistent with majority 
voting by residents who take their location, property values, and the choices of others as 
given when voting on local tax rates; (c) the budget balances for each district; (d) the state 
budget balances, and (e) at prices pdh, households cannot gain utility by moving. Whereas 
the equilibrium is proved to exist with a finite number of household types (Nechyba 
1999), for the case of an infinite number of household types I compute the equilibrium 
                                                 
15 The current model does not include private schools because the private school sector was not large in 
Detroit in 1990 (only 11.8 percent of students attended private schools) and it does not seem to have 
changed much over the decade (less than one percentage point over this period). The presence of private 
alternatives to public services violates single-peakedness of preferences over tax rates (Stiglitz 1974). 
Hence, models that include private alternatives (Nechyba 1999, Ferreyra 2007) assume that voters are 
myopic - they take their choice of public versus private school, their location, property values and others’ 
choices as given when voting on local tax rates. Under this myopia, single-peakedness over property tax 
rates holds. Voter myopia is the most commonly used assumption for voting behavior even in the absence of 
private alternatives. See Calabrese et al (2006) and Nechyba (1999) for further discussion and references. 
16 Property tax rates are often expressed in mills. A one-mill rate is equivalent to a rate of 0.1 percent. 
17 The actual formula adds a flat grant, f, to the second branch of the max operator. I omit the flat grant 
because it is very small. Also, voters’ internalization of the formula including the flat grant can potentially 
generate non-single peakedness of preferences over tax rates because for a district with G<(P+Q)/n and a 
given value of f, it is possible to have a positive, negative, or zero value for f + t(G-(P+Q)/n)) depending 
entirely on t. Thus, multiple property tax rates may maximize the median voter’s utility.    13
based on equilibrium sufficient conditions.
18  
4. The Computational Version of the Model 
The estimation strategy involves computing the equilibrium for the metropolitan area at 
alternative parameter points to search for the point that minimizes the distance between 
the predicted equilibrium and the observed 1990 data. The out-of-sample prediction 
exercise, in turn, involves computing the 2000 equilibrium using the parameter estimates, 
and comparing it to the observed 2000 data. Since the equilibrium does not have an 
analytical solution, I solve for it through an iterative algorithm for a tractable 
representation of the Detroit metropolitan area. I outline below this representation and the 
algorithm. 
Community Structure and Households 
My computational representation of the Detroit metropolitan area includes the actual 
number of districts. I construct neighborhoods such that the central city has the ten 
neighborhoods identified by the city’s actual classification of Census tracts into 
neighborhoods, and the remaining districts -all of which are relatively very small- have 
one neighborhood each. A neighborhood’s size is proportional to its actual number of 
housing units in 1990 or 2000 as needed.  
In the theoretical model neighborhood h in district d has a neighborhood quality 
index equal to kdh. Based on Ferreyra (2007), I construct this index for 1990 using 1990 
                                                 
18 With a finite number of household types, the allocation of households to locations is unique if there is 
sufficient variation in district average housing quality (Nechyba 1999). Ferreyra (2007) discusses 
uniqueness of equilibrium in a model with an infinite number of household types. Simulations for a variant 
of the current model have shown that the equilibrium is robust to the selection of different initial prices and 
assignments of households to locations, and that the equilibrium at the parameter estimates is locally unique.    14
Census tract data for the metropolitan area as follows. I regress the logarithm of tract 
average rental price on housing and neighborhood characteristics and school district fixed 
effects. Then I compute each tract’s neighborhood quality as the tract’s fitted rental value 
net of the school district fixed effect. Thus, this quality measure captures housing and 
neighborhood characteristics excluding school quality. Finally, I set the neighborhood’s 
quality index equal to the quality of the median tract in the neighborhood.  
To facilitate the comparison of the 1990 and 2000 neighborhood qualities, I apply 
the 1990 regression coefficients to the 2000 data to calculate the 2000 fitted rental values 
and neighborhood quality indexes. This ensures that the 1990 and 2000 indexes for a 
given tract differ solely because of the observed differences housing and neighborhood 
characteristics. Since 36 percent of the tracts in the metropolitan area changed boundaries 
between 1990 and 2000, I use tract-level data from the 1990 Long Form in 2000 
Boundaries and the 2000 Long Form, which are normalized to the 2000 boundaries.  






percentiles of the income distribution for households with children in K-12 grades in the 
metropolitan area in 1990 or 2000 as needed. In the computations, income and housing 
endowments are independently distributed. The equilibrium computation begins with the 
same income distribution across neighborhoods, equal to the observed metropolitan area’s. 
Since households are assumed to differ in idiosyncratic location preferences, I assume that 
ε follows a type I extreme value distribution with scale parameter 1/b where b >0. 
Thus, () () b F / exp exp ) ( ε ε − − = , and the variance of ε  equals 
2 2 ) 6 / 1 ( b π .  
School Finance   15
Under the DPE regime prevailing in Michigan until 1993, district d’s state aid, AIDd, was 
determined by the state aid formula in (5), and local property tax revenue by the first term 
of (4). Although one would expect these expressions to hold when applied to actual data 
on P, Q, n, t and G, the fact that they do not means that a model using them would hardly 
fit the data. Hence, I search for the implicit formula for which (4) and (5) hold.
19 
Furthermore, since DPE taxes residential and non-residential property equally but 
Proposal A does not, I need to quantify each type of property separately to compare policy 
outcomes. The Appendix describes the implicit formula and the property tax base 
quantification. Furthermore, under DPE the state funded state aid mostly through income 
and sales taxes. Since consumption, taxed by the sales tax, is proportional to income, I 
henceforth simplify by considering only income taxes.
20 Hence, in my computations the 
state budget constraint is  d
d
d y n AID Y t ∑ = , where Y is total metropolitan area income. 
In contrast with DPE, Proposal A established a foundation grant system by which 
the state guarantees each district a per-student revenue for operating expenses equal to its 
foundation allowance. As a function of 1993 base revenues expressed in 1999 dollars (x in 
the formula below), the foundation allowances (fa) for 1999 were determined as follows: 
                                                 
19 One reason the DPE formula does not hold when applied to the data is that Michigan uses the DPE 
formula only to deliver basic (general purpose) aid to school districts, which accounted for almost 60 
percent of all state aid in Michigan in 1990/91 (Kearney 1992) whereas the remaining aid was categorical 
(i.e., intended for specific purposes). Thus, one should not expect the application of the DPE formula to the 
data to be able to match the total amount of state aid (note that separate data on basic and categorical aid are 
not publicly available). One would expect, however, that the product of the observed local property tax rate 
times the observed average state equalized valuation for each district would be (approximately) equal to the 
observed local revenue per child. This is not the case either, perhaps due to measurement error, despite the 
fact that the property tax is the only tax that districts may levy to fund public schools. In light of these 
difficulties, I search for an empirical formula that makes (4) and (5) hold when applied to the actual data. 
20 Epple and Ferreyra (2008) consider the separate role of sales and income taxes. Their main results are 
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fa    (6) 
Under Proposal A, the state requires each district to levy 18 mills on non-
residential property and covers the difference between the foundation allowance and this 
local revenue through a 6-mill tax on residential and non-residential property, and sales 
and income taxes. Thus, residential property taxes fell from a statewide average of 34 
mills to a statewide uniform 6-mill tax. For fiscal reasons the state only guarantees 
foundation allowances up to the “maximum state guarantee” threshold ($7,200 in 1999). 
Districts with foundation allowances above this threshold (“hold harmless districts”) may 
levy up to 18 additional mills on residential property to reach their full foundation. 
To compute the Proposal A equilibrium, I first compute the DPE equilibrium that 
would have prevailed in 2000, and then determine foundation allowances by applying (6) 
to the predicted 2000 DPE revenues. Hence, a district with DPE spending below the 
maximum state guarantee has a Proposal A spending equal to its foundation allowance fad, 
and a state aid equal to  / dd Q d d AID fa t Q n =− , where  Q t  is the required 18 mills on non-
residential property tax rate. Households in this district do not vote for property taxes. In 
contrast, a hold-harmless district has spending  ( ) min , / dd d d d x fa f t P n =+  where  f is the 
maximum state guarantee and td is the property tax rate, chosen by majority voting, in 
excess of the 6 mills levied by the state.
21 This district receives state aid equal 
to / dQ d d AID f t Q n =− . 
                                                 
21 This simplifies the actual rule - it does not consider that beyond the first 18 additional mills on residential 
property it is possible to raise further mills on all property (Adonizio et al 1995). Single- peakednesss may 
be lost without this simplification. However, very few districts actually raise those additional mills.   17
 Under Proposal A, the state’s budget constraint is  ( ) yd d d d
dd
tY t P Q A I Dn ++ = ∑ ∑ , 
where Y is total income in the metropolitan area, t is the 6 mills levied by the state on all 
property, AIDd is state aid, and ty is the income tax rate, whose endogenous value balances 
the state budget. In all computations voters are subject to the constraint that property tax 
rates not surpass the 50 mill-maximum permitted by the Michigan constitution.
22 
The Algorithm 
In the model, the parameter vector is ( ) ,,, b θα β ρ = . To compute the equilibrium for a 
given parameter point, the algorithm iterates as households choose locations and schools 
and vote for property taxes until no household gains by choosing differently. The input for 
the algorithm consists of data for the model’s exogenous variables –community structure, 
neighborhood quantity and quality of housing, non-residential property, metropolitan area 
income distribution, and state aid rule- and the initial distribution of household types and 
housing prices. The output is the computed equilibrium, which yields the predicted values 
of the variables of interest in the estimation and out-of-sample prediction.
23  
5. Estimation 
In the estimation I match pre-reform, 1990 data for the following district-level variables: 
y1=average household income, y2=average housing rental value, y3=average spending per 
student in public schools, and y4=district fraction of students who pass the fourth grade 
math test normalized by the metropolitan area’s highest fraction (often called “school 
                                                 
22 This millage, which applies to assessed property values, is approximately equal to 200 mills, or 20 
percent, when applied to property market values annualized to yield rental values.  
23 More details on the algorithm can be found in Ferreyra (2007).   18
quality” in what follows).
24 I scale these variables to have unit variance in the sample. 
Let D denote the total number of districts in the sample (D=83), and use i for an 
individual district, with ni being the number of housing units sampled in district i. Denote 
by  Xi the set of exogenous variables for district i, including all districts’ number of 
neighborhoods, stock of non-residential property, quantity and quality of housing, and 





th income percentiles, 
and school funding regime). I assume the following:  
  () | ( , )            1,...4;  i 1,...D ji i j i Ey X hX j θ == =      (7) 
where the h's are implicit nonlinear functions that express the equilibrium value of each 
endogenous variable I match as a function of the exogenous data and the parameter vector 
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covariances and variances, respectively.  
I estimate the model using Feasible Generalized Non-Linear Least Squares 
(FGNLS) and account for heteroskedasticity across observations and cross-equation 
covariances. In the first stage of FGNLS I find the value of θ  that minimizes the 
following loss function: 









=− ∑∑        ( 8 )  
I use the residuals from this stage to compute the  ˆ jki σ ’s needed to transform the variables 
                                                 
24 The school quality predictions are also normalized by the highest predicted quality in the metropolitan 
area in order to fit pass rates, which lie between zero and one whether or not they are normalized. The 
normalization means that the focus is on the achievement gap relative to the highest-achievement district. 
Hence, an increase in the normalized measure for a given district represents a closing of this gap. In what 
follows school quality refers to normalized achievement, except when indicated otherwise.   19
in order to account for heteroskedasticity and cross-equation covariances. In the second 
stage I minimize the following loss function in the transformed variables: 
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where * denotes division by  ˆ jki σ . The value of θ  that minimizes this function,θˆ, is the 
estimate for the parameter vector.  
An advantage of estimating the model is the understanding of what features of the 
data identify each parameter.
25 Spending and housing prices identify the school quality 
coefficient on the utility function (α), as a higher α raises spending and most housing 
prices. Housing prices also identify the consumption coefficient in the utility function (β), 
because a higher β raises consumption and lowers housing prices. The level of spending, 
and the correlation between income and achievement, identify the elasticity of school 
quality with respect to peer quality (ρ), as a higher ρ raises this correlation and lowers 
spending. Finally, the interjurisdictional variation in income, housing prices, spending and 
achievement identifies b, which is directly related to the variance of idiosyncratic 
preferences, since a greater b makes household sorting depend less on income and more 
on idiosyncratic preferences, and thus leads to less residential segregation across districts. 
Table 1 presents the parameter estimates for the model. These are highly 
significant, mostly as a result of fitting sample means based on large numbers of 
observations. The estimate of ρ implies that peer quality contributes, on the margin, more 
                                                 
25 The model is identified if no two distinct parameter points generate the same equilibrium. Formally, a 
sufficient condition for local identification is that the matrix of first derivatives of the predicted variables 
with respect to the parameter vector has full column rank when evaluated at the true parameter point. This 
condition is met when I evaluate that matrix at my parameter estimates.   20
than spending to achievement. Furthermore, the fact that the estimate for b is close to zero 
implies that households of different incomes do not mix much within districts. 
Column 1 of Table 2 shows the root mean squared error for district average 
income, rental value, spending, and school quality, and Figures 5a through 5d depict the 
predicted and observed values for these variables. The relatively low root mean squared 
error for these variables, and the relatively high correlation between predicted and 
observed values (.84, .88, .76 and .83 for income, rental value, spending and school 
quality, respectively) indicate a reasonably good fit of the data. This is encouraging given 
the parsimonious model. The good fit of district average household income and rental 
value indicates that the model captures locational patterns, although very high income or 
house values are under predicted because the empirical income distribution is truncated at 
the 90
th percentile. The efforts to quantify property tax bases and to construct implicit 
funding formulas have helped fit spending. Furthermore, the model fits school quality 
quite well, with the same caveats noted for income given the high estimate for ρ. 
Table 3 shows the correlations between the matched variables for the observed and 
fitted values. The correlations for fitted values resemble the actual correlations reasonably 
well. The correlations involving predicted spending are somewhat understated, and the 
correlations involving predicted school quality are somewhat overstated. However, fitting 
spending is probably the most challenging aspect of estimation. Furthermore, pass rates 
measure the corresponding theoretical construct only imperfectly and are likely affected 
by substantial measurement error (Kane and Staiger 2002). Overall, I view the evidence 
presented here as indicative that the model successfully captures patterns in the data.  
6. Out-of-Sample Prediction   21
Perhaps more critical for counterfactuals is whether the model can fit out-of-sample data – 
namely, whether the predicted 2000 equilibrium can replicate the data. If I had the 
exogenous data needed to compute the 1993/94 equilibrium, I would be able to predict the 
2000 foundation allowances because they are a function of 1993/94 revenues. Since such 
data are not available, to compute the 2000 equilibrium I feed the algorithm with the 2000 
value of the exogenous variables and compute the equilibrium that would have prevailed 
in 2000 had the DPE regime been still operative.
26 I then use (6) to determine foundation 
allowances given 2000 DPE revenues, and compute Proposal A’s equilibrium. Thus, the 
success of the 2000 predictions partly depends on the counterfactual 2000 DPE.  
Pass rates rose consistently over the decade, perhaps due to learning about the test 
(see Section 2). This improvement displayed a ceiling effect: low-performing districts, 
with the greatest room for gains, indeed displayed the largest gains. When computing the 
2000 equilibrium, I account for this phenomenon by modeling a proportional achievement 
growth which is larger for low-performing districts and thus consistent with the ceiling 
effect.
27 As for revenues, a district’s predicted 1999 revenue equals the predicted 
foundation allowance if the district is not allowed to raise hold-harmless mills based on its 
2000 DPE revenues. Otherwise, the predicted revenue equals the maximum state 
guarantee plus the revenue from hold harmless mills. 
                                                 
26 In order to compute the 2000 DPE equilibrium, I need to choose a value for the GTB. Lacking 
information on what the GTB would have been in 2000, I choose the observed 1990 value expressed in 2000 
dollars. To the extent that this GTB may be too low, the resulting DPE spending for low-revenue districts is 
also low. Hence, some of the policy effects in section 7 are best viewed as an upper bound. 
27 I do this as follows. I raise all (unnormed) school quality predictions by an additive constant, such that the 
ratio between this constant and the average predicted 1990 (unnormed) quality is the same as the ratio 
between the observed average increase in (unnormed) achievement over the decade and the observed 1990 
(unnormed) achievement. The adjustment helps match the higher mean and lower variance of achievement 
in 2000 relative to 1990, which are typical of the implementation of a new test (see Section 2). It is 
reassuring that predictions with and without the school quality adjustment show very similar patterns. A 
regression of the school quality predictions including the adjustment on the predictions without the 
adjustment has an intercept of 0.36, a slope of 0.64, and an R
2 of 0.999. Note that predictions for 2000 
without including the school quality adjustment correspond to the Proposal A simulations in next section.   22
  Column 2 of Table 2 depicts the root mean squared error for average income, 
rental value, foundation allowance, spending and public school quality, and Figures 6a 
through 6e depict their 2000 predicted and observed values. Overall, the model fits the 
out-of-sample data reasonably well. There is a bunching of predicted allowances at the 
minimum foundation ($5,700) because the model under predicts the corresponding DPE 
revenues. Similarly, the model over predicts DPE revenues (and foundation allowances) 
for other districts. However, the relatively high correlation between predicted and 
observed foundation allowances (0.71) reveals an overall good fit for this variable.  
Figure 6d displays actual and fitted spending (fitted spending and foundation 
allowance differ for hold-harmless districts). In the data, 22 districts are allowed to raise 
hold-harmless mills.
28 The model correctly predicts the hold-harmless status of 14 
districts, out of which 8 are predicted to raise hold-harmless mills. Revenue is well fitted 
overall (the correlation between observed and fitted values equals .71). Figure 6e displays 
observed and fitted school quality. The model predicts school quality quite well (the 
correlation between observed and predicted values is .69), although with under prediction 
for some medium-performance districts and slight over prediction for top districts. 
A comparison between panel (a) of Tables 3 and 4 reveals that correlations among 
the variables of interest did not change much between 1990 and 2000, except that the 
larger school quality improvement for lower performance districts severed the association 
between school quality and other variables. As panel (b) of Table 4 shows, the model 
reasonably replicates the observed 2000 correlations.  
                                                 
28 No direct evidence exists that these districts raised hold-harmless mills in 2000, but the vast majority of 
these districts did so in 2005/6. See http://www.michigan.gov/mde. 
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One might ask whether the model captures changes in the endogenous variables 
occurred over the decade. Hence, Table 5 displays correlations between the observed and 
predicted changes, the latter computed as the difference between 2000 and 1990 
predictions. As the table shows, the model predicts the changes in endogenous variables 
quite well. Furthermore, the “observed data” row of Table 6 shows the pattern of changes. 
Low-revenue districts experienced greater absolute and relative increases in revenue, and 
greater property tax relief. Furthermore, low-income districts experienced greater income 
growth. One possible explanation is that higher-income households might have migrated 
towards lower-income locations in response to Proposal A’s incentives. Alternatively, 
since the low segment of the income distribution experienced the greatest proportional 
gains in real income (see Section 2), low-income districts might have grown richer simply 
because their originally inhabitants became richer. I re-examine this matter in Section 7.   
Moreover, rental values grew the most in districts with the lowest values, which 
benefited from the highest revenue increases, largest property tax reductions, and greatest 
increases in household income. Districts with the lowest initial school quality reaped the 
largest proportional gains, an outcome likely associated with the ceiling effect. The 
correlations in the “fitted data” row of Table 6 are encouraging because they show that the 
model captures the observed pattern of changes. 
Table 7 displays correlations among proportional changes in the variables of 
interest. Correlations among changes in the endogenous variables are reasonably captured 
by the model, although with some overstatement. Moreover, the model captures the fact 
that locations with the greatest proportional housing quality increase experienced the 
greatest increase in household income, rental value and revenue. Nonetheless, actual 
correlations involving housing quality changes are not particularly high. The correlations   24
involving change in district relative size also seem captured by the model. However, these 
correlations are almost totally driven by the city of Detroit, because changes in relative 
size are almost negligible outside the central city, and quite small for the central city. 
Furthermore, the reported effects of the housing stock reduction in the central city mostly 
capture effects of the property tax reform. The city’s average income, property value, 
spending and school quality rose by 17, 106, 11 and 178 percent respectively. The model 
predicts these changes quite well (24, 166, 4 and 254 percent, respectively).    
To sum, the model fits the out-of-sample data reasonably well. This lends 
plausibility to the counterfactual 2000 DPE, and provides confidence for policy analysis.
29 
7. Policy Analysis 
In this section I investigate the effects of several school funding reforms including 
Proposal A. To predict the equilibrium for each funding policy I first compute the 
benchmark 2000 DPE equilibrium, and then the corresponding policy’s equilibrium based 
on the benchmark. DPE is the natural benchmark because it was the prevailing regime 
before Proposal A. In order to focus exclusively on funding issues, school quality in these 
simulations does not incorporate the proportional growth described in Section 6. 
Table 8 characterizes the equilibrium for the benchmark DPE and alternative 
policies by presenting effects on school revenues, demographics, property values, school 
                                                 
29 The out-of-sample data corresponds to a setting where school districts have little discretion to determine 
expenditure. This might appear as a limitation for the out-of-sample prediction exercise to the extent that 
one is interested in counterfactuals that preserve local discretion (as in the DPE simulations examined 
below). However, the voting model finds some validation with the hold-harmless districts, whose behavior 
is fit reasonably well. In addition, the model is indirectly validated through the predicted foundation 
allowances because these are a function of the counterfactual 2000 DPE revenues, which are determined by 
voting. Furthermore, the voting model fits the in-sample data, where tax rates are determined by voting. 
Calabrese et al (2006) have also found that the voting model fits the data reasonably well when peer effects 
are accounted for.   25
quality and fiscal considerations in panels (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e), respectively. Column 1 
pertains to the benchmark DPE equilibrium, in which 14 out of 83 districts have property 
tax bases per student smaller than the guaranteed tax base (GTB). They receive state aid 
($460 on average), funded by income taxes paid mostly by households in high-income 
districts.
30 Variation (measured by the ratio of the highest to the lowest value and the ratio 
of the 75
th to the 25
th percentile) in revenue, income, property values and school quality 
across districts is considerable. Urban and low-income districts display the lowest income, 
property values, revenues and achievement in the metropolitan area, and the highest 
property tax rates. However, fiscal redistribution favors these districts, as the net income 
tax subsidy per student (per-student aid minus the household’s income tax liability) is 
positive for them yet negative for wealthier districts.  
Proposal A 
Column 2 of Table 8 displays the effects of Proposal A, and Figure 7 depicts Proposal A 
revenues relative to the benchmark 2000 DPE. As is clear from (6), the twenty-five 
districts with 2000 DPE revenue above $6,673 lose funding, whereas the urban and low-
income districts with 2000 DPE revenues below $5,502 gain funding. The tax reform 
favors all districts, although urban and low-income jurisdictions experience the greatest 
property tax relief because they have the highest property tax rates in the benchmark. 
Thus, all aspects of Proposal A benefit these districts proportionally the most. 
As panel (a) shows, Proposal A reduces the variation in revenue across districts, as 
it raises urban revenues by 58 percent on average and lowers high-income districts’ 
revenues by 18 percent on average. Furthermore, average income rises slightly in urban 
                                                 
30 In these simulations, “high-income districts” are those allowed to raise hold-harmless mills in Proposal A.   26
districts (see panel (b)), because their revenue increase and property tax reduction attracts 
some higher income households. In contrast, by losing revenues and the ability to choose 
them, hold-harmless districts lose some high-income households to other districts, 
particularly those with relatively good housing. As these relocations take place, income 
variation drops across districts.
31 Nonetheless, the changes in average household income 
across districts are quite small, which indicates that the reform has little effect on 
household sorting, a result consistent with Epple and Ferreyra (2008) and Roy (2004). 
This is because Proposal A affects school spending, which is less important than peer 
quality in the production of school quality and hence has little ability to affect households’ 
choices. Compounding this problem, housing quality in urban and low-income districts is 
not high enough to attract many higher income households. Thus, the actual income gains 
experienced by the lowest income districts over the nineties (see Section 6) are more 
likely associated with changes in the overall income distribution, which relatively favored 
original residents in those districts, than with household relocation. 
Changes in property values display a similar pattern as changes in income (see 
panel c). Because they reflect the net effect of lower property taxes and changed school 
revenues, urban districts attain the largest gains (3 percent on average) and high-revenue 
districts experience the largest losses (2 percent on average).  
An important issue is whether Proposal A affects school quality (see panel (d)). 
Since peer quality has a prominent role in the production of school quality, and peer 
qualities do not change much across districts, school qualities change at much lower rates 
                                                 
31 In the case of income, the highest to lowest ratio is the same as for DPE and the other revenue-equity 
policies, whereas the 75
th to 25
th percentile ratio is lower for Proposal A and the other policies than for DPE. 
Thus, while the relocations favor low-income districts, they are not strong enough to alter the income gap 
between the highest and lowest income districts.   27
than revenues. Urban districts gain the most school quality (8 percent on average), while 
high-income districts lose the most (4 percent on average). Hence, school quality variation 
shrinks, though not as much as revenue variation. The fact that equalization policies are 
more effective at equalizing revenues than school quality is a theme in these simulations 
and shows the limitations faced by state aid policies, a point also made by Nechyba 
(2004). The contrast between Proposal A’s average predicted proportional change in 
school quality (0.05) and its observed counterpart over the decade (0.77) suggests that 
little of this increase is associated with Proposal A. Moreover, my results are consistent 
with others in the literature. In my simulations, a ten percent revenue increase is 
associated, on average, with about two additional percentage points in the pass rate, 
similar to estimates reported by Papke (2005) using data for the whole state of Michigan.  
Panel (e) reflects the reform’s fiscal impact. The average tax burden per household 
is only slightly higher than in the benchmark. The property tax reform leads to lower 
residential yet higher non-residential taxes, which are a subsidy to households, and higher 
income taxes. In contrast with the benchmark, students in high-income districts receive 
some state aid under Proposal A, although these households also pay greater income tax 
bills. Hence, their net income tax liability goes from $500 to $4,000. The reverse is true 
for students in other districts, which go from an average income tax subsidy of $100 to 
one of $1,100. Even though high-income districts undergo, on average, almost the same 
tax burden in the benchmark and Proposal A, most of their benchmark burden consists of 
property taxes to fund their own schools rather than income taxes to fund others’ schools.  
Even though high-income districts retain some local discretion on tax rates, they 
still face a revenue cap. Currently 28 states restrict supplementation in some way, and the 
most radical recent reforms in Kansas, Vermont, Texas and Kentucky also include   28
supplementation limits (Yinger 2004). To investigate the importance of these limits, I 
simulate a variant of Proposal A that allows these districts to raise their desired level of 
property taxes. As it turns out, removing the supplementation limits has no effect on high-
income districts, which bear most of Proposal A’s fiscal cost. In other words, Proposal A 
affects disposable income in these districts to such an extent that they choose not to raise 
additional mills even when allowed to do so.
32 
Since Proposal A entails both a tax and a revenue reform, it is interesting to isolate 
the effects of the tax reform. This reform amounts to adopting a state-wide property tax to 
fund K-12 schools, as was also the case in California and New Hampshire (McGuire and 
Papke 2008). Thus, I simulate a reform such that each district’s revenue remains the same 
as in the benchmark, the foundation allowance equals the benchmark revenue, and the tax 
regime is the same as in Proposal A (the only difference is that hold-harmless districts 
raise all the residential mills needed to reach their foundation and have the same revenue 
as in the benchmark). Column 3 of Table 8 displays the effects of this tax reform. Its main 
impact is on property values, which fully capitalize the reduction in property taxes as 
gross-of-tax property values are the same, on average, in the benchmark and the tax 
reform.
33 Hence, the reform leads to overall housing appreciation (4% on average), 
particularly in urban districts which have the highest benchmark property tax rates. Of all 
the policies studied here, the tax reform is the only one to increase all property values; the 
other reforms generate gains and losses for low and high-income districts, respectively. 
                                                 
32 This squares with Yinger (2004), who concludes that reforms that raise state taxes in high-wealth districts 
will reduce supplementation in those districts to some degree, as seems to have been the case in Kentucky. 
33 If the tax reform replaced residential property taxes only with income taxes, then the gross-of-tax property 
value of every house would be the same before and after the reform. However, the fact that some of the 
revenue from residential property taxes is replaced by non-residential property taxes creates a subsidy for 
households, which thus experience a positive yet small income effect. This leads to slight changes in the 
value of individual houses although the average gross of tax property value remains the same.   29
Furthermore, this full capitalization rate is consistent with the empirical evidence from 
Epple and Ferreyra (2008) and aggregate-data results from Guilfoyle (1998). My results 
on tax reform also illuminate the experience in Kentucky, Texas and Vermont, which 
adopted similar reforms recently (Yinger 2004).  
To summarize, one goal of Proposal A was property tax reduction. Another was 
equity of revenues across districts, and alternative policies could have been implemented 
to this end. The two main mechanisms commonly used to equalize revenues are District 
Power Equalization (DPE) and foundation formulas (Yinger 2004), which I analyze 
below. The benchmark for comparison continues to be the 2000 DPE. 
District Power Equalization 
As of 1993 Michigan already had a DPE regime aimed at equalizing revenues One reason 
revenues varied so much across districts in Michigan by 1993 was that policy-makers had 
allowed the guaranteed property tax base (GTB) to lag behind property values (Cullen and 
Loeb 2004). Thus, the state could have raised the GTB to secure greater equity. Column 4 
of Table 8 shows the effects of doubling the nominal GTB. This amounts to a real GTB 
increase of about 50 percent, and moves the resulting GTB per student from the initial 30
th 
percentile of the metropolitan area distribution of property tax base per child to slightly 
above the 40
th percentile. This regime (“low GTB”) is of interest because the average 
fiscal burden per household is the same as Proposal A’s.  
In the low GTB regime, the initial fourteen in-formula districts receive at least 
twice as much aid as in the benchmark, and ten additional districts are covered by the 
formula. On average, revenues rise by about 10 percent yet urban districts gain the most. 
As Figure 7 shows, this policy reduces revenue variation relative to the benchmark   30
although less successfully than Proposal A because revenues depend on local preferences 
for tax rates. At the same time, the low GTB policy hurts high-income districts less than 
Proposal A precisely because it preserves local discretion. Since the low GTB policy alters 
revenues less than Proposal A, demographic and school quality changes are also smaller.  
Duncombe and Yinger (1998) discuss the limitations of DPE to achieve revenue 
equalization. Quantifying the limitations is an empirical matter because of the equilibrium 
response of voters, property values, and community compositions to DPE incentives. My 
results suggest that if one remains committed to DPE, greater equalization can only be 
achieved by setting a very high GTB. Thus, column 5 of Table 8 explores the effects of 
increasing the initial GTB by a factor of five, which amounts to a real GTB increase of 
about 270 percent and leaves GTB at the 99
th percentile of the distribution of property tax 
base per student. This regime (“high GTB”) amounts to an almost complete equalization 
of property tax base per student, requiring the same total state aid as Proposal A. 
 As Figure 7 shows, all districts gain additional revenue relative to the benchmark, 
and urban districts experience the largest proportional gains. Although revenues are more 
equally distributed across districts, both relative to the benchmark and to the low GTB 
regime, they still vary because property tax rates vary. This is consistent with the 
experience in Missouri reported by Yinger (2004), where GTB was also set at a very high 
level (the 95
th percentile of the distribution of property tax base per student).  
 While total state aid in the high GTB regime is the same as in Proposal A, total 
school expenditure is higher because districts can choose their property tax rates. Thus, 
households undergo a greater property tax burden - greater than in Proposal A, the low 
GTB regime, and the benchmark. Since the higher revenues do not affect school quality 
much yet impose a large fiscal burden, property values fall in the vast majority of districts.    31
This analysis highlights DPE’s limitations to achieve revenue equity at a 
reasonable fiscal cost. Currently, only three states rely exclusively on DPE (Indiana, 
Missouri and Wisconsin); in these states, revenue differences persist due to differences in 
local tax rates. Thus, ten states (Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Montana, Oklahoma, Texas, and Vermont) rely on a two-tiered system that combines 
foundation and DPE. Large revenue disparity may remain, however, in these combination 
programs (Picus et al 2008). I now turn to the system that would have completely 
equalized revenues: a foundation of uniform level across districts. 
Uniform Foundation 
Basic school finance aid is distributed through a uniform foundation in California and 
Arkansas. Clearly, the effects of a uniform foundation depend on the foundation level. 
Whether school finance reform has historically raised or lowered (“leveled up” or “leveled 
down”, respectively) revenues is still an open question.
34 Hence, Columns 6 and 7 of 
Table 8 display the effects of setting revenues equal to the benchmark median and highest 
revenue in the “low foundation” and “high foundation” regimes, respectively. For ease of 
comparison, the tax structure is the same as in Proposal A. Thus, state aid for a district is 
the difference between the foundation and the district’s required property tax revenue. As 
in Proposal A, the foundation revenue cannot be supplemented. 
Figure 7 depicts revenues from the foundation regimes. With the low foundation, 
urban and suburban districts experience average revenue gains of 69 and 24 percent 
respectively, yet high-income districts lose at an average rate of 38 percent. Although this 
                                                 
34 Yinger (2004) and Fischel (2001) review the literature that explores this issue and which yields mixed 
results. Fischel (2001) examines individual states and concludes that leveling down may have prevailed. 
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regime induces greater demographic changes than Proposal A, the changes are still small. 
Moreover, the policy boosts property values in urban and some suburban locations but 
depresses them in high-income districts.  
In contrast to the average revenue gain of 35 percent, the average school quality 
gain is only 11 percent. School quality variation indeed falls though not as much as 
revenue variation, showing again the limits of revenue equalization policies. The question, 
then, is whether equalizing revenue at a higher level would lead to greater school quality 
gains, a question addressed by the high-foundation simulation. Although the average 
funding gain for this policy is 228 percent, the demographic effects are the same as for the 
low foundation. This result, which may be surprising, arises because the two foundation 
programs eliminate spending as a source of variation across districts, hence leaving 
housing quality as the only exogenous amenity on which households sort. Since housing 
qualities are the same in both programs, so are households’ choices and school qualities.
35  
  Among the policies studied so far, the high foundation leads to the lowest rental 
value variation because of the large decline in property values in high-income districts, the 
greatest reliance on income taxes and the highest tax burden. Despite this high cost, the 
high foundation remains unable to eliminate the achievement gap. Foundations’ inability 
to equalize achievement is consistent with evidence from California’s (low) foundation 
program presented by Downes (1992), who finds virtually no difference in the distribution 
of achievement across districts before and after California’s reform. 
Adequacy 
                                                 
35 Recall that my measure of a district’s school quality is the district’s achievement normalized by the 
metropolitan area’s highest achievement. According to this measure, school quality is the same for each 
district in both foundation programs. Absolute (unnormed) achievement, on the other hand, is higher under 
the high equalization. Relative (normed) achievement highlights the fact that the gap between a given 
district and the highest achievement district is invariant to the foundation level used for the equalization.   33
The adequacy movement has sought to secure the funding needed to guarantee a 
“meaningful” or “adequate” education to all children in a state (Rebell and Wolff 2008), 
and plaintiffs have adopted a variety of approaches to determine the cost of the desired 
achievement (Downes and Stiefel 2008). Whereas one can discuss the relative merits of 
each approach, none of them considers the equilibrium effects of funding changes. For 
instance, a district’s additional funding district might attract higher-income to the district 
and hence raise its peer quality. Thus, the funding increase needed for an adequate 
education might be substantially lower than originally thought.  
Column 8 of Table 8 presents simulations of an adequacy program that provides 
revenue so that each district achieves at least 30 percent of the highest district’s 
achievement. For ease of comparison with the other policies examined here, the program 
awards each district a foundation whose level is the maximum between the district’s 
foundation allowance in Proposal A and the funding required for the achievement target. 
The tax structure is the same as in Proposal A.  
In the simulations, ten districts have a benchmark achievement below the target, 
and these districts account for about 30 percent of all students in the metropolitan area. 
Holding peer quality constant, the income tax rate required to finance the adequacy 
program would be close to 65 percent. However, the revenue increase for the low-
performing districts generates some household relocation towards these districts that 
improves their peer qualities. In equilibrium, the required income tax rate to finance the 
adequacy program is 10 percent, much lower than the partial equilibrium estimate.  
While 30 percent of the highest achievement might not seem an ambitious goal, 
loftier goals appear to be fiscally very costly. For instance, securing funding so that all 
districts achieve at least at 40 percent of the highest achieving district entails an   34
equilibrium income tax rate of about 45 percent, and the fiscal burden rises at an 
increasing rate with the achievement target. The political feasibility of such high fiscal 
burdens is highly doubtful, which is why I limit my analysis to the goal of having all 
districts achieve at least at 30 percent of the highest achieving district.  
As Figure 7 shows, revenues from the adequacy program are quite similar to those 
from Proposal A except for a handful of districts, mostly those with initial achievement 
below the target. These districts attain impressive revenue gains. For instance, the cost of 
an adequate education in Detroit Public Schools is close to $30,000 per student (as 
opposed to the $5,700 granted by Proposal A), and between $20,000 and $100,000 for ten 
other districts. Since state aid is funded mostly though income taxes, high-income districts 
choose to collect lower property taxes –and obtain lower revenues - than in Proposal A. 
As  expected, the adequacy program triggers some household relocation. In 
particular, districts with initial average household income below $20,000 are the chosen 
destination for some households from districts with average household income between 
$40,000 and $50,000. These relocations, however, are quite limited relative to the 
dramatic funding increase received by the lowest achievement districts. Pressed by the 
higher fiscal burden of this program, some high-income households also leave their 
original districts in favor of more affordable locations. Except for the poorest districts, 
which benefit the most through the program, rental values fall everywhere, particularly in 
high-income districts and even in some of the districts that receive additional funding.  
  Of all the policies considered here, adequacy is the most effective in terms of 
school quality. Although the ratio of 75
th to 25
th school quality percentiles does not change 
much, highest-to-lowest ratio does. In other words, this policy lifts up the lower tail of the 
achievement distribution, and brings districts in the upper tail down because they lose   35
revenue and good peers. The counterpart of the achievement gain for the low-performing 
segment is, of course, the fiscal cost. The average tax burden per household is the highest 
among the policies considered here, as is the income tax rate. In light of No Child Left 
Behind’s requirement to attain a 100 percent proficiency rate by 2013/14, my simulations 
suggest that the cost of attaining this goal would be nothing short of prohibitive.
36   
This does not mean, however, that extra resources would always be ineffective; 
rather, it means that extra resources per se might not be very effective. The question, then, 
is whether other, non-revenue based policies might succeed. Public school accountability 
is one such policy which seems to have been particularly effective among low performing 
districts and students (Jacob 2005, Chiang 2007, Rouse et al 2007). As a result, a number 
of schools have implemented positive behavioral changes (Chiang 2007, Rouse et al 2007, 
Rebell and Wolff 2008). These effects are noteworthy, particularly because 
accountability’s cost is negligible relative to school funding reform’s (Hoxby 2002). 
The magnitude of my estimated peer quality parameter suggests that policies 
aimed at raising peer quality for low-achieving students might be effective. For instance, 
the state of Michigan implemented open enrollment across school districts in 1996, though 
the program remains quite small.
37 Perhaps more importantly, my measure of peer quality 
(household income) is correlated with the quality of parental and home inputs in the 
                                                 
36 Reich (2006) writes that “…literally to have ‘no child left behind’ would cost nothing less than the 
entirety of each state’s budget, and even then it is doubtful that the last child would achieve to the adequate 
standard…”. Rebell and Wolff (2008) adhere to this view. Findings from the recent “Getting Down to Facts” 
initiative in California also echo my results. Imazeki (2006) and Sonstelie (2006) calculate that very large 
funding increases are needed to meet the desired achievement target in California because poverty has a 
large effect on achievement yet resources have a modest effect. Even when districts receive extra funding 
based on adequacy studies, the evidence suggests that they do not use it productively (Picus et al 2008). 
37 Under this legislation, districts choose whether to receive out-of-district applications. According to my 
calculations, only 5 percent of the K-12 students in the Detroit metropolitan area were participating in these 
programs in 2006. Not surprisingly, most of the participants resided in low-achievement districts and gained 
access to better districts through the program. See www.michigan.gov for further detail on the public school 
choice programs in Michigan.    36
production of child achievement.
38 The recognition that socioeconomic resources are 
related to achievement hardly provides a policy prescription to close the achievement gap 
(Duncan and Magnuson 2005). However, some high-quality interventions engaging 
children and their parents, particularly before school entry, have proved to be successful 
(Loeb and Bassok 2008). Furthermore, recent research highlights that the cognitive skills 
targeted in school reform programs are complementary with non-cognitive skills (such as 
character traits and personal habits) in the production of human capital (Cunha et al 2006). 
Thus, the effectiveness of school reform might be further harnessed through educational 
processes that help students develop both types of skills. 
8. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I have presented an empirical framework for large-scale policy analysis. 
Because of their potential effects on several markets, large-scale policies must be 
evaluated in an equilibrium framework. Given the high cost of these policies, it is of 
interest not only to conduct an appropriate evaluation of the observed policies but also to 
analyze counterfactual policies. I apply my framework to the study of school finance 
reform in the Detroit metropolitan area, exploiting the occurrence of an actual reform 
(Proposal A) in 1994. I estimate an equilibrium model of school quality, and household 
residential and school choice using 1990 data. To validate the model, I use the parameter 
estimates to predict the 2000 equilibrium, and compare these predictions with 2000 data. 
The reasonably good fit of the in- and out-of-sample data generates some confidence in 
                                                 
38 The importance of home inputs is highlighted by Todd and Wolpin (2007), who estimate that about 10 
percent of the black-white achievement gap could be closed by equalizing home inputs, and that 
approximately 50 percent of the gap is attributable to differences in mothers’ pre-market skills.   37
the model for policy analysis. According to my simulations, closing the achievement gap 
across districts requires a prohibitively large funding increase, even after taking into 
account mobility effects. These findings are clearly relevant from a policy perspective, 
given the 100 percent proficiency goal established by No Child Left Behind.  
  My study relies on a short-run model that assumes that certain variables are 
exogenous. Thus, it might seem that by specifying the observed value of the exogenous 
variables, one is in part forcing the direction of the changes between 1990 and 2000 and 
thus undermining the power of out-of-sample prediction. Perhaps the greatest concern 
arises over the fixed housing stock, although changes to this stock over the decade do not 
seem to bear a strong relation with other changes, as noted in the discussion of the out-of-
sample exercise.
39 While my attempt to predict the equilibrium at different points in time 
is no replacement for a long-run, dynamic equilibrium model, I am the first to consider 
interjurisdictional data from different points in time in an equilibrium framework, and to 
examine how these points differ. Thus, I view this exercise as an intermediate step 
between the current empirical Tiebout models, which rely exclusively on cross-sectional 
data at one point in time and do not conduct model validation (see Bayer et al 2005, 
Calabrese et al 2006, Ferreyra 2007, and the references therein), and future research that 
might endogenize the housing stock. The fact that the current model is broadly consistent 
with the in- and out-of sample data makes it useful for short- and medium-run analysis. 
Successful out-of-sample exercises increase the confidence in our models and allow us to 
examine policies of otherwise costly implementation. Any rigor we can bring to this 
process is certainly desirable, and this paper is a step in that direction. 
                                                 
39 The concern over changes in the metropolitan area income distribution is lessened by the fact that the 
changes in the metropolitan area income distribution for Detroit are qualitatively similar to those occurred in 
the United States as a whole over the nineties (Autor et al 2005).   38
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TABLE  1 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Estimates 
α  0.137 (0.003)
β  0.740 (0.003)
ρ  0.871 (0.002)
b  0.006 (0.001)
Sum of Squared Residuals 569.669 
 
Standard Errors in parentheses. Number of observations: 83 school districts. 
 
TABLE 2 























Number of observations: 83 districts. Data refer to district averages, and are weighted by 
district number of housing units. Sample means are in parentheses. Income, rental value and 
spending are expressed in $10,000. School quality ranges between 0 and 1. 
 
TABLE 3 
In-Sample Goodness of Fit: Some Correlations  
 
a. Observed Data 
  Income  Rental Value  Spending  School Quality 
Income 1       
Rental Value  0.99  1     
Spending   0.66  0.65  1   
School  Quality  0.85 0.86 0.59  1 
 
b. Fitted Data 
  Income  Rental Value  Spending   School Quality 
Income 1       
Rental Value  0.98  1     
Spending   0.46  0.44  1   
School  Quality  0.99 0.98 0.54  1 
 
Number of observations: 83 districts. Data refer to district averages, and correlations are weighted by district 
number of housing units.   42
 
TABLE 4 
Out-of-Sample Goodness of Fit: Some Correlations  
 
a. Observed Data 




Income 1       
Rental Value  0.98  1     
Foundation Allowance  0.63  0.61  1   
School Quality  0.69  0.70  0.46  1 
 
b. Fitted Data 
 Income  Rental  Value  Foundation 
Allowance 
Spending   School 
Quality  
Income 1         
Rental Value  0.99  1       
Foundation Allowance  0.38  0.38  1     
Spending 0.41  0.41  0.97  1   
School Quality  0.99  0.99  0.43  0.45  1 
 
Number of observations: 83 districts. Data refer to district averages, and correlations are weighted by district 




 Out-Of-Sample Goodness of Fit: Correlation between Observed and Predicted Changes 
 
Income  Rental Value  Revenue  School Quality  
0.39 0.46 0.60 0.59 
 
Number of observations: 83 districts. Data refer to the correlation between district predicted and observed 
change in the corresponding average.  
 
TABLE 6 




  Income  Rental Value  Revenue  School Quality 
Observed  Data  -0.23 -0.63 -0.72 -0.83 
Fitted  Data -0.26 -0.72 -0.76 -0.79 
 
Number of observations: 83 districts. Data refer to district averages and percent change in district averages. 
For instance, -0.23 under “Income” for the observed data means that the correlation between 1990 observed 
income and the percent income change over the decade is -0.23, and -0.26 under “Income” for the fitted data 




Out-of-Sample Goodness of Fit: Correlations between Changes 
 
a. Observed Data 
 Income  Rental 
Value 
Spending School 





Income   1           
Rental Value   0.49  1         
Spending   0.13  0.27  1       
School  Quality  0.22  0.59  0.20  1   
Housing 
Quality 
0.35 0.20  0.26  0.05  1   
Relative Size  -0.35  -0.72  -0.03  -0.73  0.05  1 
 
 
b. Fitted Data 








Income   1           
Rental Value   0.75  1         
Spending    0.47  0.40  1       
School Quality   0.67  0.96  0.50  1     
Housing 
Quality 
0.48 0.25  0.27  0.09  1   
Relative Size  -0.17  -0.67  0.21  -0.56  0.05  1 
 
Number of observations: 83 districts. Data refer to percent change in district average for income, rental 
value, spending, school quality and housing quality, and change in district relative size. Correlations are 
weighted by district number of housing units.   44
TABLE 8 
Effects of Alternative Policies 
 
a. Revenue per Student 
 
















Average Revenue  $5,700  $6,400  $5,700  $6,100  $9,900  $6,100  $14,900  $19,200 
   Urban Districts  $3,600  $5,700  $3,600  $4,500  $8,800  $6,100  $14,900  $42,200 
   Suburban Districts  $6,400  $6,700  $6,400  $6,600  $10,200  $6,100  $14,900  $12,100 
     High-income Districts  $10,100 $8,200  $10,100  $10,100  $13,000  $6,100  $14,900  $8,600 
Highest / Lowest  10.06  2.30  10.06  7.51  4.22  1.00  1.00  99.59 
75
th pctile. / 25
th pctile.  2.21  1.26  2.21  1.84  1.28  1.00  1.00  1.26 
Avg. Proportional Change    0.34 0.00  0.10  0.96  0.35  2.28  5.10 
   Urban Districts    0.58  0.00  0.26  1.43  0.69  3.14  11.30 
   Suburban Districts    0.26  0.00  0.05  0.81  0.24  2.02  3.17 
     High-income Districts    -0.18  0.00  0.00  0.32  -0.38  0.52  -0.12 
 
 
b. Household Income 
 
















Average Income  $66,700 $66,700  $66,700  $66,700  $66,700  $66,700  $66,700  $66,700 
   Urban Districts  $26,700 $26,900  $26,900  $26,700  $25,700  $27,100  $27,000  $27,000 
   Suburban Districts  $79,100 $79,100  $79,100  $79,100  $79,400  $79,000  $79,000  $79,000 
     High-income Districts  $94,100 $91,000  $93,800  $93,400  $91,000  $88,300  $88,300  $89,200 
Highest / Lowest  8.40  8.40  8.40  8.40  8.40  8.40  8.40  7.62 
75
th pctile. / 25
th pctile.  2.54  2.42  2.53  2.50  2.49  2.34  2.34  2.37 
Avg. Proportional Change    0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
   Urban Districts    0.01  0.01  0.00  -0.04  0.01  0.01  0.01 
   Suburban Districts    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.03 
     High-income Districts    -0.04  0.00  -0.01  -0.04  -0.08  -0.08  -0.07 
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c. Rental Value 
 
















Average Rental Value  $21,500 $21,900  $22,300  $21,300  $20,900  $21,800  $21,100  $18,300 
   Urban Districts  $12,100 $12,400  $12,600  $12,100  $11,900  $12,400  $12,300  $10,600 
   Suburban Districts  $24,400 $24,800  $25,300  $24,200  $23,700  $24,700  $23,900  $20,700 
     High-income Districts  $28,200 $27,800  $28,700  $27,800  $26,500  $26,900  $26,000  $23,000 
Highest / Lowest  4.49  4.48  4.57  4.46  4.32  4.45  4.27  3.90 
75
th pctile. / 25
th pctile.  2.05  1.97  2.00  2.02  1.98  1.91  1.88  2.12 
Avg. Proportional Change    0.02  0.04  -0.01  -0.02  0.02  -0.01  -0.15 
   Urban Districts    0.03  0.04  0.00  -0.02  0.03  0.02  -0.12 
   Suburban Districts    0.02  0.03  -0.01  -0.02  0.01  -0.02  -0.15 
     High-income Districts    -0.02  0.02  0.00  -0.06  -0.05  -0.08  -0.20 
 
 
d. School Quality 
 
















Average School Quality  0.50  0.52  0.51  0.51  0.52  0.54  0.54  0.55 
   Urban Districts  0.22  0.23  0.22  0.22  0.23  0.25  0.25  0.30 
   Suburban Districts  0.59  0.60  0.60  0.60  0.61  0.63  0.63  0.63 
     High-income Districts  0.73  0.70  0.73  0.73  0.72  0.70  0.70  0.71 
Highest / Lowest  8.21  6.81  8.20  7.89  7.40  6.38  6.38  3.33 
75
th pctile. / 25
th pctile.  2.27  2.22  2.26  2.25  2.22  2.10  2.10  2.17 
Avg. Proportional Change    0.05 0.00  0.01  0.06  0.11  0.11  0.22 
   Urban Districts    0.08  0.01  0.03  0.05  0.16  0.16  0.41 
   Suburban Districts    0.04  0.00  0.01  0.07  0.09  0.09  0.16 
     High-income Districts    -0.04  0.00  -0.01  -0.03  -0.06  -0.06  -0.05 
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e. Fiscal Implications 
 























Residential Property Tax Rate                 
   Average  0.07  0.02  0.03  0.07  0.07  0.02  0.02  0.02 
   Minimum  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.02 
   Maximum  0.09  0.06  0.10  0.09  0.09  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Non-Resid. Property Tax Rate                 
   Average  0.07  0.10  0.10  0.07  0.07  0.10  0.10  0.10 
   Minimum  0.04  0.10  0.10  0.04  0.04  0.10  0.10  0.10 
   Maximum  0.09  0.10  0.10  0.08  0.09  0.10  0.10  0.10 
Income Tax Rate  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.03  0.02  0.07  0.10 
Avg. Tax Burden per Household   $1,700 $1,800 $1,400  $1,800 $3,300  $1,600  $5,000  $6,800 
Avg. Net Income Tax Subsidy per 
Student 
$0 $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0 
   High-income Districts  -$500  -$4,000  -$2,600 -$1,100 -$4,500  -$5,100  -$11,100  -$25,700 
   Low-income Districts  $100  $1,100  $700  $300  $1,200  $1,400  $3,100  $6,600 
Avg. Share of Residential Property 
Taxes  
0.69 0.21  0.30  0.64  0.38  0.22  0.09  0.15 
Avg. Share of Non-Resid. Prop 
Taxes 
0.22 0.26  0.31  0.21  0.13  0.30  0.12  0.21 
Avg. Share of Income Taxes  0.09  0.53  0.39  0.15  0.49  0.48  0.79  0.64 
 
Number of observations: 83 districts. For a given variable, “Highest/Lowest” is the ratio of the metropolitan area’s highest to lowest district average, “75
th pctile. 
/25
th pctile,” is the ratio of the metropolitan area’s 75
th to 25
th percentile, and “average proportional change” is the average of the proportional change in district 
averages. Changes are computed relative to the benchmark 2000 DPE. Dollar figures rounded to closest hundred. All averages are weighted; weight is number of 
housing units.  
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FIGURE 1 
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Source: 1990 School District Data Book, Michigan Department of Treasury, and Michigan Department of 
Education.   48
 
FIGURE 2  
1999 Real Foundation Allowance and 1993 Base Revenue 
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FA: Foundation Allowance. Revenue and foundation allowance expressed in thousands of 2000 dollars. 
Source: Michigan Bulletin 1014. 
 
FIGURE 3 
Districts, Neighborhoods and 1990 Housing Quality in the Detroit Metropolitan Area 
 
1990 Housing Quality 
by Neighborhood









The thicker black lines represent school district boundaries, and the thin lines represent neighborhood boundaries. 
Source: author’s calculations using 1990 Census data.   49
FIGURE 4 
Changes in the Detroit Metropolitan Area 
a 
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Share of housing stock is expressed as a percent relative to the metropolitan area, and change in share is expressed in 
percentage points. Source: Michigan Department of Treasury, School District Data Book, and author’s own 
calculations based on 1990 and 2000 Census.    50
 
FIGURE 5  































Observed Avg. Hh. Income
 
Figure 5b - Average Rental Value 




























Observed Avg. Rental Value
 
 
Figure 5c – Spending per Student in Public 



















































Note: observed values on the horizontal axis; fitted values on the vertical axis. Circle size is proportional to the 
observation’s total measure of households. Correlations between fitted and observed values are weighted by the 
observations’ measure of households and are as follows: 0.84, 0.88, 0.76, and 0.83 for Figs. 5a through 5d 
respectively.    51
 FIGURE 6 – Out-Of-Sample Goodness of Fit: Fitted vs. Observed Values 



























Observed Avg. Hh. Income
 
Figure 6b - Average Rental Value 




























Observed Avg. Rental Value
 
Figure 6c – Foundation Allowance 

























Figure 6d – Per-Pupil Spending 

















































Note: see Figure 5. Correlations between fitted and observed values are weighted by the observations’ measure of 
households and are as follows: .82, .86, .71 .71, .69 for Figs. 6a through 6e respectively.    52
FIGURE 7  
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Note: “log” stands for natural logarithm. Revenues are expressed in $10,000. Source: author’s simulations.   53
Appendix 
 
Under the DPE regime prevailing in Michigan until 1993, district d’s state aid, Ad, was 
determined by the following state aid formula: 
  ( ) ( ) ˆ ˆ max 0, dd d Af t G E =+ −      ( A 1 )  
where  f is a flat grant,  ˆ
d t is the district’s millage raised for operational purposes, ˆ G is the 
guaranteed level for the assessed tax base per student, and Ed is the district’s per-student assessed 
valuation of the property tax base. In Michigan, property is assessed at half of its market value, 
and in 1989 the nominal values of f and  ˆ G  were $310 and $83,610, respectively. 
In principle, one would expect (1) to hold when applied to actual data on AID,  ˆ t , and E. 
One would also expect the following expression for local property tax revenue in district d, ld, to 
hold when applied to actual data: 
ˆ
dd d lt E =        ( A 2 )    
Since neither (A1) nor (A2) hold for actual data,
40 I search for the implicit formulas for which 
(A1) and (A2) hold when applied to actual data. According to these formulas, 
( ) ˆ max 0, ( ) dd d d AID t G P φ =−      ( A 3 )  
ˆ
dd d d ltP γ =        ( A 4 )  
where  d P is half of the observed average house value in district d.
41 
To compare DPE and Proposal A outcomes in policy simulations I need to quantify 
                                                 
40 The expression in (A1) does not hold in the data whether or not the flat grant f is included in the formula.  
41 I use half of the observed average house value because the observed tax rates apply to assessed values.   54
residential and non-residential property separately, because DPE treats both types of property 
equally but Proposal A does not. Furthermore, this quantification needs to be consistent with the 
implicit formulas (A3) and (A4). Hence, for 1990 I proceed as follows. I express the per-student 
total property tax base in district d as  ( ) 1 dd d Ph r + , where  d h is the number of households per 
child in the district and  d r is the ratio of non-residential to residential property. This recognizes 
the fact that the observed average house value in any given district differs from the per-student 
property tax base because not every household has one child, and because the property tax base 
includes non-residential besides residential property. This allows me to express the per-student 
residential property tax base as  dd Ph   and the per-student non-residential property tax base 
as dd d Phr . Consistency with the implicit formulas requires a relationship among  d φ , d γ , hd and rd 
for each district. Hence, I run the following regressions using 1990 data:
42 
  12 ˆ
dd d d ab h b h r φ =+ +       ( A 5 )  
  12 ˆdd d d ab h b h r γ =+ + %% %       ( A 6 )  
I then quantify the per-student residential property tax base as  1 ˆ 2
aa d
dP d d d d
d
a






%  and 
the per-student non-residential property tax base as  2 ˆ 2
aa d
dQ d d d d d
d
a






%  to fit the aid 
implicit formula (A3).  Similarly, I quantify the per-student residential and non-residential 
property tax base, respectively, as  1 ˆ 2
xx d
dP d d d d
d
a






% % %  and 
2 ˆ 2
xx d
dQ d d d d d
d
a






% % %  to fit the spending implicit formula (A4). It can be verified that 
                                                 
42 Data on h come from the School District Data Book, and data on r come from the Citizens’ Research Council of 
Michigan.    55
aa
dd d d PQ P φ += , which is the value of the property tax base for which (A3) holds, and 
xx
dd d d PQ P γ += , which is the value of the property tax base for which (A4) holds.  
  In (A1) through (A4), property values refer to assessed values, and tax rates are the 
millages applied to assessed values. In contrast, the model and computational applications use 
market rental prices for property values, and the millages are scaled correspondingly. The 
relationship between a given  ˆ t which applies to assessed property values and t, which applies to 







, where u is the user cost on owner-occupied housing units, equal to 
0.12 for the 1990.
43 Hence, in the computational version of the model 
( ) ( ) max 0, ( )
aa
dd d d AID t G P Q =− + and  ( )
xx
dd d d d x tP Q A I D =+ + , where G is the GTB, equal to 
$20,066 (=$83,610*0.12*2, given that it applies to property rather than assessed values), and the 
P’s and Q’s are the market rental value of per-student residential and non-residential property tax 
base in district d respectively. I calculate the P’s and Q’s by applying the φ % and γ%  factors to the 
average house value determined endogenously in the equilibrium computation.  
In quantifying property tax bases for 2000 I face the challenge that since DPE no longer 
applied in 2000, I cannot use a similar approach to recover the adjustment factors. Having 
experimented with alternative mechanisms to obtain the 2000 adjustment factors and noticing the 
similarity of the results, I opted for the simplest solution of using the same as in 1990. In 
particular, I apply the γ%  factors to the average house value determined endogenously in the 
equilibrium computation to calculate the P’s and Q’s.  
                                                 
43 I apply the same user cost rate to 1990 and 2000 in order to focus on rental value changes due exclusively to 
house value changes. See Epple and Ferreyra (2007) for details on the calculation of the user cost rate.    56
Finally, it is necessary to compute the total metropolitan area income in order to calculate 
the equilibrium income tax rate. I compute total income as  ddd
d
Yy n γ =∑ , where the number of 
households in each district is adjusted by the spending factor γd  for consistency with (A4). 
Without this adjustment, average tax burden per household would dramatically increase under 
Proposal A, which relies less on property taxes and more on income taxes. This would not be 
correct given that the property tax reform substituted tax instruments without a dramatic increase 
in tax burdens. 
 